made incompatible matches for research purposes. 4 Even without such meddling, online dating can lead to lawsuits. 5 It is not irrational for social media providers to seek to capitalize on their data when they provide the platforms for free. 6 Indeed, their business model is to sell data to third parties for marketing and other purposes.
7 Yet, users should be able to expect that their data is not used to hurt them or is not sent to disreputable companies. Indeed, fewer people would use social media if the price were incurring a mood disorder or being manipulated to vote in a particular way. 8 While technology continues to push the boundaries of law as it evolves, effective legal protection has not evolved with it. 9 As evidenced by recent events, the field of privacy has failed social media users. 10 Meanwhile, the field of cybersecurity arose to address cybercrime, but many of the questionable uses of REV. 290, 293-94 (2011) (explaining the business model of social networking websites).
8 "I'd feel betrayed to find out that a company that purports to be a conduit to help me find others' content turned out to be shaping my experience according to its political agenda." Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 337 (2014) .
9 "In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act ('SCA') to provide additional protections for individuals' private communications content held in electronic storage by third parties. . . . Yet, because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the technology of 1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA consistently with regard to similar private content sent using different technologies." Christopher J. social media data were legal. The legality of these problematic actions has received criticism and prompted calls for change.
11
There are several choices lawmakers and policymakers have when it comes to the protection of social media data from exploitation by social media companies. Among these are fiduciary duties in corporate and trust law, as well as the duty of care in tort law.
12 However, can these centuries-old legal frameworks grasp the risks and consequences of the improper use of big data generated by social media, or must they be tweaked?
This Essay examines the benefits and drawbacks of fiduciary duties and the duty of care frameworks in the context of social media. Any framework must hold data holders responsible for data breaches while fitting their business model.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Fiduciary duties are a package of obligations imposed on those entrusted with the interests of others, often in regard to financial holdings in the fields of corporate law and trust law. 13 The two main fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.
14 The duty of care essentially requires the fiduciary to pursue the interests of the other party to the fiduciary relationship, whereas the duty of loyalty basically demands that the conduct of the fiduciary be free from conflict and selfdealing. 15 A fiduciary may also owe subsidiary duties, such as duties of good faith.
16 11 "As technological innovation accelerates, so does the need to recalibrate individual expectations, social norms, and, ultimately, laws and regulations." Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7, at 73. "Consumers, companies, and policymakers increasingly think about collection and control of personal information, and the media prominently highlights these issues." Nicole A. Trust is a significant factor in people's willingness to share personal information on online social networks.
19 Thus, the fiduciary duty model may be applicable.
20
There are several reasons to apply a fiduciary duty framework to social media. Fiduciary duties have few exceptions, making them strong protectors of users. When engaged in self-dealing, for example, the fiduciary in trust law is subject to a no-further-inquiry principle-good faith and fairness to the beneficiaries are not a defense.
21 This would also prevent social media companies from abrogating these duties in their contracts with users, 22 thus barring Facebook from contractually requiring its users to weaken the company's duties of loyalty and care. This is important given the contractual nature of the relationship between users and social media companies.
23
One useful feature of this framework is its subset of subsidiary duties, such as the duty for social media platforms to do due diligence on companies buying or otherwise seeking the big data generated by social media users. 24 For example, Facebook would have to explore the background of companies seeking its data with the intention of preventing the Cambridge Analytica scenario. 25 Another relevant and important fiduciary duty is to delegate work with the data only to reasonable parties, carefully selecting, instructing, and monitoring them. 26 Finally, the duty of prudence in trust law requires a degree of care, skill, and caution. 27 MICRO FOCUS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2017) , https://blog.microfocus.com/howmuch-data-is-created-on-the-internet-each-day/.
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 26 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 13, at 658-60. 27 Specifically, a trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the duties would slow the involvement of bad actors seeking big data from social media platforms.
However, there are drawbacks to imposing fiduciary duties on social media structures. Among these are the number of duties and the strictness of the standard, which may be ill fitted to impose on a voluntary, nonfinancial relationship. For example, the conflict of interest that social media companies have with user data is practically inherent to their business model, possibly leading to the distortion of the fiduciary duty standard. Fiduciary duties may simply be too inflexible for the social media context. These concerns are less prevalent in the duty of care in tort law.
II. DUTY OF CARE
The duty of care is a legal obligation that a party act toward another as a reasonable person in the circumstances would. 28 In a tort case, if the actions do not meet the standard of care, then the actor may be liable for any injuries caused.
29
The duty of care between two parties depends on their relationship. For example, product manufacturers have a duty to consumers to make safe products, property owners have a duty to visitors to protect them, and business directors have a duty to shareholders to make reasonable decisions in the best interests of the business.
30
However, courts have been hesitant to establish a duty of care owed by data aggregators to consumers who are not the customers. 31 Indeed, "[w]hen consumers seek to enforce a breached duty of care claim, courts struggle to coherently establish when and between whom the duty existed."
32 Two recent cases reflect the courts' hesitancy:
In Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., the court held that a payment processor owed no duty to consumers using the company's platform to send funds to merchants. Similarly, in In re Zappos.com, Inc., the court declined to treat a company statement about the security policy as an enforceable contract and also denied the existence of an implied contract to safeguard the data.
33
If the courts continue to find no duty of care in the social media context, legislators may decide to introduce a statute that imposes such a duty. Applying the duty of care to the social media context accepts social media's function to collect and profit on people's data. Social media users do not produce confidential information-they produce big data. In contrast, for example, a lawyer representing a client must use reasonable care to avoid inadvertent disclosure of confidential information. 36 Thus, the duty of care can acknowledge the business model of firms in big data, while requiring that they vet the companies with which they interact. It continues to incentivize Facebook and other social media companies to engage in exchanging free services with users for data, while limiting the possibility of data compromise. This would avoid giving user data to companies like Cambridge Analytica, but would not harm Facebook's relationships with established businesses like Sephora.
37
While it is difficult to determine which actions would breach the duty of care, perhaps at least "novel, unexpected use of existing information" can be discouraged.
38
Given the social media model, it may be that the duty of care is more appropriate than fiduciary duties. This would justify the application of the duty of care from tort law to the modern-day problem of data protection in social media.
CONCLUSION
The current framework for protecting users of social media does not work. Modern cybersecurity laws do not apply to the social media model of sharing or selling user data. In contrast, both the centuries-old fiduciary duties and the duty of care in tort law offer ways to protect the data of social media. They provide remedies to social media users by allowing them to sue the social media company that failed to uphold the duty owed, which would influence the way social media companies use their data and self-police. The adaptability of ancient common-law doctrine to modern dilemmas could thus save social medial users a lot of grief, undue influence, and harm. REV. 53, 65 (2017) .
